Παρασκευή 18 Οκτωβρίου 2024

Mikael Valtersson - ANALYSIS: 2024 IS AUTUMN OF 1942 NOT 1944 IN THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR, OCT 18, 2024I know that many pro-Russians believe that the Russo-ukrainian war is at its end stage, similar to the situation for the Russian Empire in the autumn of 1916 or Germany in the autumn of 1944. I don't agree with that assessment.Even in the unlikely situation that Ukraine was in the same situation as the Russian Empire in the autumn of 1916, with the ensuing March Revolution, remember then that Russia continued the war for one more year even though they had two revolutions during that year.The situation in Ukraine is probably worse than in Germany during the autumn of 1942 when it comes to armaments and manpower, but Germany also had an overextended army by that time. The tide of war had begun to shift, even if many didn't realise it then, since the German held territory reached it's maximum in October/November of 1942.During the end of the year Rommel retreated, from Egypt and then most of Libya, after the failed Battle of El Alamein. At the same time, the allies invaded Vichy french Morocco and Algeria, while German forces took Tunisia.On the Eastern front the Red Army started its counteroffensive and encircled Stalingrad. But neither the Battle for North Africa or Stalingrad was over by the end of 1942.The situation for Ukraine is similar. They have too high losses by their experienced troops and among fighting vehicles. Too low inflow of new war material and many new and inexperienced soldiers. The balance of military resources has tilted against Ukraine during the year, even though territorial losses have been small.In 2025 the main scenario is that the year will be more like the first half of 1943 or as a secondary scenario as the entirety of 1943. Germany lost at Stalingrad and also lost everything east of Ukraine on the southern front in the East. At the same time North Africa was lost. On both fronts German losses were very high and hard to replenish. The imbalance of the fighting forces continued to grow.During the second half of 1943 southern Italy and Sicily fell into allied hands. The Battle of Kursk was a German failure and waste of resources. It subsequently led to the loss of eastern Ukraine during the autumn of 1943. The imbalance also continued to grow in allied favour, even though Germany increased it's war production significantly.If 2025 will be like the first half of 1943 or the entirety of 1943 for Ukraine is hard to say, but it will at least be as the first half of 1943 with a growing imbalance of military resources. High and hard to replace Ukrainian losses, along with increasing territorial losses. It will be more and more obvious to both participants and onlookers that the war is about Ukrainian survival and not Ukrainian victory in the war.Remember also that a war must not continue until the last part of territory is taken, as in Germany in 1945. There will probably be a negotiated ceasefire, and maybe peace as well, long before that. A Russian occupation of the entirety of Ukraine, with an ensuing guerilla warfare in western part of Ukraine for half a decade, as in 1945-50, is very unlikely.A divided Ukraine with a neutral western part with limitations on its military and Russian control in the eastern and southern parts are a more likely end of the war. That will probably happen at the earliest in the summer of 2026, but the war could in a worst case scenario drag on to the end of 2027.If Russia would be satisfied with the freezing of frontlines and abandoned parts of the annexed territories, the war could of course be ended in 2025, but I don't believe Russia would be satisfied with that, since it would mean giving away official Russian territory.That option would only be possible if Russia made huge territorial gains during 2025. Areas that Russia could swap or exchange for western Kherson. The most likely territory for that is the Kharkov oblast.

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