Mikael Valtersson. ANALYSIS: WILL UKRAINE LAUNCH ANOTHER CROSS BORDER INVASION?, AUG 12th 2024Many speculate about other Ukrainian offensives into Russia, but are other offensives plausible? Probably not, at least during 2024, since UkrAF lacks resources. UkrAF have already moved all available units they have to the northern Sumy and Kharkov fronts. They have reduced their forces on the Belarusian border, in the Strategic reserve and on both the Eastern and Southern fronts. The Ukrainian forces in the North are now evenly split between Sumy and Kharkov regions. Most of the units in the Sumy region are already occupied directly or indirectly in the Kursk offensive. There are very limited Ukrainian resources that can be diverted to other areas. At least without aborting the Kursk offensive.If Ukraine would send troops somewhere else it would probably be back to the Belarusian border or to the SE front. Tension has again risen at the Belarusian border and Belarusian and/or Russian troops have been moved again to the border areas. In Southern Donetsk RuAF continues their successful offensive towards Toretsk, Pokrovsk etc. This offensive is partly due to the lack of Ukrainian resources and the collapse of the entire SW Donetsk area is getting closer. If that would happen RuAF would be behind the deep (50km) Ukrainian fortified areas and have free rein to advance through Eastern Dnipro and Southern Kharkov regions. Thereby threatening the entire Ukrainian Eastern front.Another factor hindering a new Ukrainian offensive is that RuAF have resumed strengthening border fortifications along the border. This means that minor Ukrainian incursions into Russian territory will be much harder to achieve. The growing disparity of forces, in Russian favour, will also make large scale assaults by Ukraine more and more unlikely. In a best case scenario Ukraine can replace losses at the front, but the replacements will be inexperienced and of a much lower quality than the lost soldiers.At the same time Russian military strength is growing. Ukrainian general Syrskyi recently said that Russian forces in Ukraine might grow by 170K men from 520K to 690K during the second half of 2024. By invading Russian territory the Russian border areas will be included in the warzone and the number of Russian troops in the fighting might grow by at least another 100K, including conscripts.The Kursk offensive might also finally get Russian authorities to act on building real Territorial defence units, especially in the border regions. 50-100K new Territorial defence soldiers might not be a game changer, but definitely be another step tilting the balance in Russian favour.To conclude this analysis, the Ukrainian Kursk offensive are probably more of a last ditch attempt to strengthen Ukrainian and western political resolve and also to bolster waining support to continue the war. This had to be done while there still was possible to do it with a chance of at least temporary success.The operation in the Kursk region will at least continue for 1-3 months more and give a favourable picture of Ukrainian capability during that time. Unfortunately a very high rate of Ukrainian losses during that time might destroy all remaining Ukrainian reserves and leave UkrAF very thinly stretched all over the front. Much like the German Ardenner offensive (Battle of the Bulge) in December 1944.I would have used the available units as defensive reserves ready to be used when Russian breakthroughs were imminent. In the long run that would probably have caused higher Russian losses, but been more boring than an flamboyant offensive into Russia.